INTRODUCTION
Central to the appraisal of transport interventions is the calculation of welfare changes. Discrete choice models can assist this process in two ways: firstly in the development of demand forecasts and secondly through the derivation of marginal values for policy variables (e.g. the value of travel time savings). This paper focuses on the latter application and the circumstances in which the marginal values derived from the models, when used in a transport appraisal, can lead to a serious bias in the welfare benefit estimate of a transport intervention.
In the transportation field it is normal to calculate the welfare benefits of an intervention through the change in Marshallian consumer surplus in combination with the assumption of a linear demand curve. The latter assumption is usually referred to as the Rule of Half convention. The two main inputs to the calculation are the price of and demand for the transport good before and after the intervention. The price of a trip is taken to be given by the generalised cost of that trip, whilst the demand (by time period) before and after the intervention can be derived through a variety of different analytical methods depending on the particular context of the policy intervention. Abstracting from the merits of the different methods available to forecast demand a good demand model would give an accurate prediction of the demand in any future year with and without the intervention. The demand for transport post-intervention in a good appraisal should therefore include both a substitution effect from a lowering/raising of the price (or generalised cost (GC)) of the transport good and an income effect. A good transport appraisal therefore accurately measures Area GC 0 a'b'GC 1 in Figure 1 (b) when estimating the welfare benefit of a transport intervention. That is it will measure the area under a linear approximation to the Marshallian demand curve between the price before (GC 0 ) and after (GC 1 )the transport intervention.
The 'exact' welfare benefit of a transport intervention is in fact given by either of the Hicksian measures of compensating or equivalent variation. With its reference point of pre-intervention utility levels compensating variation is generally accepted as the appropriate Hicksian measure for a transport cost-benefit analysis of changes in transport quality (see for example Boardman et al., 2001 pp.59-64) .
The compensating variation represents the income equivalent of a price change. In a transport context it is the maximum a transport user will pay for a transport intervention. It is illustrated in Figure 1 (a) as the difference between points G and J, and in Figure 1 (b) by the Area GC 0 a'c'GC 1 . With transport acting as a normal good and a reduction in generalised cost, as in Figure 1 (b), the compensating variation is always less than the consumer surplus. The difference between the two measures stems from the need to exclude the income effect when calculating the willingness to pay for a transport intervention. With reference to Figure 1 (a) the initial bundle of goods comprises a composite good (Y) and a transport good (X) and is given by point a on indifference curve U 0 . The pre-intervention budget constraint is given by line GH. A reduction in the generalised cost of transport reduces the slope of the budget constraint post intervention to that depicted by line GI. This results in an optimum post intervention bundle of goods at point b on indifference curve U 1 . The resulting change in demand for transport (X 1 -X 0 ) can be decomposed into a substitution effect (X C -X 0 ) and an income effect (X 1 -X C ). This is because at the postintervention prices but at the initial utility level (U 0 ) the budget constraint would be JK and the optimum bundle of goods would be at point c with a demand for transport of X C . The maximum willingness to pay for the transport intervention therefore is given by the difference in the intercepts on the y-axis of the budget constraints GI and JK. That is the maximum willingness to pay is given by the difference between G and J. This is equivalent to the area under the Hicksian utility compensated demand curve between the pre-and post-intervention generalised costs and, as mentioned above, is illustrated in Figure 1 (b) by Area GC 0 a'c'GC 1 . Willig (1976) argues that in almost all circumstances, and certainly where the change in consumer surplus is less than 5% of income, consumer surplus is a good approximation to the 'exact' compensating variation measure. For example, with an income elasticity of 0.8 and a consumer surplus that is 5% of income the compensating variation is within 2% of the change in consumer surplus. It is because of arguments such as Willig's that the change in consumer surplus as a measure of the change in welfare has become de rigueur in transport cost benefit analysis. A further argument espoused in support of consumer surplus is that the income effect can only be estimated imprecisely. By attempting to correct for the income effect an additional error is introduced into the welfare benefit calculation and this can prove more costly in terms of precision than just using the consumer surplus estimate with no correction (Alston and Larson, 1993) .
As transport can form a large proportion of total household expenditure (14% on average in the case of the UK (ONS, 2007 Table 1.1)) and household's use of time (about 1 hour on average per day (Metz, 2005) ) a policy intervention that significantly affects the generalised cost of transport could potentially generate changes in consumer surplus that are large in relation to income. Such changes could for example be generated by a policy that has a large impact on frequently made commuting trips rather than occasional discretionary trips. In such situations, and for the reasons discussed above, the change in consumer surplus may not be a good approximation to compensating variation. Whilst acknowledging this limitation, there has been little development to date in the transport economic literature to addressing the problem. The earliest work is that by Jara-Díaz and Videla (1990) who found that for medium income Chilean households the change in Marshallian consumer surplus is 12% higher than the compensating variation. In more recent work Cherchi and Polak (2007) found for a low income Italian sample (transport expenditure comprises 50% of total expenditure) the change in consumer surplus is 30% larger than the compensating variation. For high income people (transport expenditure comprises 13% of total expenditure) the error is much smaller (<5%) as it is for a mixed sample of high and low income people. Daly et al. (2008) using the Dutch national model system estimate that the compensating variation of a policy to introduce national road pricing with a very high per km charge is 34% lower than the change in consumer surplus (i.e. the change in consumer surplus overestimates the 'exact' welfare benefit by just over 50%).
Clearly the limited evidence that exists suggests that the impact of including income effects in the calculation of the welfare benefit from a transport intervention is quite varied. In some instances the impact can be tolerated at a practical level but in others it seems very large. Furthermore each of these studies uses analytical methods to include and exclude income effects from the demand function to obtain either the estimate of the change in consumer surplus or the estimate of compensating variation. Errors in the estimation of the Marshallian and Hicksian demand functions may dominate any comparison between the two measures of welfare benefit and this may cloud the findings available in the literature.
The assumption of a linear demand curve also introduces an error into the appraisal. For small cost changes this error is not an issue, but for large changes a significant overestimation in the change in consumer surplus can occur. Nellthorp and Hyman (2001) for example argue that the error associated with a linear approximation to the demand curve is more than 10% when cost changes exceed 33%. Two potential errors therefore exist in a typical transport appraisal. Firstly that associated with assuming the change in consumer surplus is a good approximation to the compensating variation, and secondly assuming the Rule of Half convention gives a good approximation to the change in consumer surplus. This paper is distinct from the existing literature in that it comes at the problem of from a different angle. Instead of estimating different demand schedules and comparing the benefit measures as Jara-Díaz and Videla, Cherchi and Polak, Daly et al. and Nellthorp and Hyman have done, the research presented here uses two different stated choice designs to separately estimate marginal values of headway and operating hours for ferry services. The marginal values from the first design are used to calculate the change in consumer surplus of a transport intervention using the Rule of Half convention, whilst the marginal values from the second design represent the compensating variation. A comparison between the two benefit measures identifies the error associated with using the Rule of Half convention to approximate welfare benefits in the presence of an income effect.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section of the paper presents the empirical analysis. It provides background information on the stated choice survey, and describes the econometric models estimated. The third section utilises the marginal valuations from the econometric models to derive estimates of the change in consumer surplus and the compensating variation. The fourth and final section presents the conclusions and suggests avenues for further research.
2
Empirical analysis
Data
The data used in this analysis were collected in the Outer Hebrides in 2005 as part of a wider study to obtain estimates of the marginal values of ferry headways and operating hours, as well as the difference in risk premium between a ferry and a fixed link (a bridge or a causeway) (Laird, 2008 Chapters 4, 5 and 6) . For this paper only the data from the household survey is utilised.
Householders on the islands of Scalpay, Berneray, Eriskay and Vatersay were surveyed (see location maps in Figure 2 and Figure 3 ). These islands are part of the Outer Hebridean group and lie approximately 80 kilometres from the mainland of Scotland. They are linked to the ten other populated islands in the group, by a series of fixed links and ferries, and to the mainland by ferries. Each of the surveyed small islands had recently had its lifeline ferry service to the main islands replaced by a fixed link. Of the small islands the largest is Scalpay, with a population of just over 300 (GROS, 2008 Such timetables, combined with small island populations, meant households had limited access to the types of facilities, services, and employment opportunities their mainland counterparts take for granted. One of the purposes of the household survey therefore was to elicit the willingness to pay for the alleviation of restrictive ferry timetables. From the perspective of this paper what makes the sample interesting is that on average households are not wealthy and the benefits of the transport intervention per household are large. This is due to the frequency of off-island trips by residents and the potential large benefits per trip that can be derived from improving restrictive ferry timetables.
As part of the survey respondents faced three tasks of particular relevance to the interest of this paper. They were asked to choose between two types of ferry service in what is referred to hereafter as the local ferry stated preference game, and they were asked to choose between a ferry and a fixed link in what is referred to hereafter as the fixed link stated preference game and they were asked a contingent valuation question to elicit the annual willingness to pay to replace to increase the operating day of a ferry from 12 hours to 24 hours. Each of the tasks was framed within the context of the old ferry service to the island and/or the fixed link that replaced it. Example scenario cards and the question that supported the cards are given below in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . In the local ferry SP game the ferry services were described by headway (H), operating hours (OH) and fare (P). For the fixed link SP game the ferry service was described by the same attributes, whilst the fixed link option was described by a council tax premium and relative journey time compared to the ferry service. In both SP games there were no vehicle restrictions on the ferry. Additionally, for the fixed link SP game only operating hours varied between scenarios for the ferry and only the council tax premium varied between scenarios for the fixed link. In this game the ferry was also free at the point of use. Householders were interviewed face-to-face, and completed questionnaires were returned from 149 households. This represents just under 50% of the population over the four islands. This gave a maximum number of cases of 596 for the local ferry SP game and 745 for the fixed link SP game. After data cleaning this reduces down to 404 and 517 cases respectively. Further details of the survey design and data cleaning process are described in Laird (2008, Chapters 4 and 6 ).
An important distinguishing feature between the two stated preference games, from the perspective of this paper, is that the payment vehicle for the local ferry game is a fare per trip, whilst that for the fixed link game is an annual premium on the household's council tax (a local tax used to fund amongst other things local transport services). It is this difference that allows the comparison of the results from the econometric models fitted to the two SP datasets to be used as a basis for comparing the change in consumer surplus and compensating variation of a transport intervention. 
Estimation results

The econometric model
The modelling approach adopted within this paper essentially follows industry practice for the analysis of stated choice data (e.g. Bateman et al., 2002 chapters 7 and 8; Hensher and Greene, 2003) . Multinomial logit (MNL) and mixed logit (MXL) models are estimated to the data. The added value the MXL model form has over the MNL model form is that it overcomes the problem of repeated choices and taste variation between individuals (Train, 2003 Chapter 6) .
For the ferry alternatives in the stated preference games the following econometric specification for utility is adopted. For the fixed link alternative in the fixed link stated preference game the following utility specification is used.
where FixedLink k α is the population segment specific intercept for the fixed link, arising from its unobserved attributes, including journey time, convenience and availability (reliability).
In application equations 1 and 2 are not fully identified. This means that for the local ferry stated preference game ferry k α is not estimated. For the fixed link stated preference game only the difference between the respective alternative specific constants can be estimated
) rather than the two separate constants. This constant also includes differences in attributes that do not vary between the SP scenarios (e.g. journey time).
Local ferry stated preference game
In the first instance multinomial logit (MNL) models were estimated. An unsegmented model linear in headway, operating hours and cost is presented in the first column of Table 1 ). This model is linear in cost and is a step function in headway and operating hours. The model acts as the starting point for the estimation of the MXL models. Model LF-MXL3 uses a normal distribution function to capture taste variation, model LF-MXL4 uses triangular distribution function with no constraints on the spread, and model LF-MXL5 a triangular distribution function with the spread constrained to the mean. The log-normal distribution is not used as it results in unrealistically high estimates of the mean willingness to pay (see e.g. Laird, 2008 Chapter 5). As can be seen from the log-likelihood values introducing taste variation into the model improves the level of fit significantly for the models fitted with the normal (LF-MXL3) and the unconstrained triangular (LF-MXL4) distributions. The improvement in fit over the MNL model of the constrained triangular distribution (LF-MXL5) is marginal. In the models presented only some of the variables are treated as random. This is because some of the spread parameters are not significantly different from zero. It can also be seen that the introduction of taste variation reduces the number of variables in the models. That is the distribution functions capture some of the variation in marginal utility that previously required an additional variable.
The advantage of using the constrained triangular distribution over the normal or unconstrained triangular distributions is that no part of the distribution of willingness to pay values has the wrong sign (negative). The fit, however, of the models with the unconstrained normal or triangular distributions is better (LF-MXL3 and LF-MXL4). These models result in a proportion of the population being attributed a negative willingness to pay -between 0% and 14% depending on the model estimated, the attribute in question and the attribute's level. For a practical application such proportions, whilst undesirable, are considered acceptable. Of the two models LF-MXL3 and LF-MXL4, model LF-MXL4 (triangular unconstrained) has a marginally higher log-likelihood and the fitted distribution is also bounded which the normal distribution (model LF-MXL3) is not. This is more appealing as it is unrealistic to expect the marginal utility of headway and operating hours to tend to infinity for some members of the population. On these grounds LF-MXL4 is taken as the preferred model.
The second column of Table 2 shows the marginal values from the preferred model are, depending on headway length, 2.0 and 11.3 pence per headway minute and, depending on the length of the operating day, 19.7 and 34.7 pence per operating hour. These marginal valuations are within design range of the stated preference questions and this gives confidence in the validity of the results. Using average occupancies from the Berneray ferry suggests that a headway minute is valued between 0.07 and 0.42 of a car-IVT minute (depending on headway length), whilst an operating hour is valued between 0.73 and 1.28 car-IVT minutes (see Table 3 ). No confidence intervals are available for these results which derive from the preferred mixed logit model. The case for these results being robust therefore centres on how well the parameters of the distribution functions for the different marginal utilities have been estimated. As can be seen from Table 1 they are all significant at the 99% level. Some confidence in the robustness of the results can also be gained from the preliminary MNL model (LF-MNL1) where the 95% confidence intervals for the marginal value of headway and operating hours are +/-25% or below.
The validity of these results is important for the comparison that will be made in Section 3. The uniqueness of this research however makes it difficult to make comparisons with other empirical evidence. The only empirical evidence in the literature to which it is directly comparable is that by Bråthen and Hervik (1997) which has since been adapted into Norwegian appraisal guidance (Bråthen and Lyche, 2004 Table 12 ) for other forms of public transport. Notes: Mean and standard deviation values estimated using a monte-carlo simulation based on a population of 10,000 (split into the statistically relevant socio-economic groups from the model using sample proportions). Lowest and highest 2.5% are excluded from calculation of mean and standard deviation for the unbounded normal distribution (LF-MXL3) (Hensher and Greene, 2003; Cirillo and Axhausen, 2006) . Fixed cost coefficients and bounded distributions mean that all 10,000 simulations are used for LF-MXL4 and LF-MXL5. 
Fixed link stated preference game
The same estimation strategy to that used for the local ferry stated preference game was used for the estimation of a model to the fixed link stated preference game data. An unsegmented model linear in operating hours and cost is presented in the first column of Table 4 . Experimentation with segmentation by socio-economic characteristics and different forms for the function ( ) OH g gave rise to model FL-MNL2 as the best performing MNL model (second column of Table 4 ). This model is linear in cost and is a step function in operating hours. It was not possible to fit estimate a mixed logit model with anything but a constrained triangular distribution assumed for the policy variables. The estimation process did not converge if a normal distribution function was used (with or without constraints on the standard deviation) or an unconstrained triangular distribution was used. The best performing mixed logit model is FL-MXL4 and is presented in the third column of Table 4 . This model is taken to be the preferred mixed logit model on the grounds of fit and ability to reproduce the observed willingness to pay distribution function (see Laird, 2008 pp.155-160). and TC is the triangular with spread constrained equal to the mean. For each random parameter two coefficients are estimated (b and c). For the triangular mean=b and spread=c. Tstatistics in parentheses. Parameter is significant at 99% level if the t-statistic>2.33; at the 95% level if the t-statistic>1.96 and at the 90% level if the t-statistic>1.65. T-statistics for MXL models calculated using robust standard. MNL models estimated with ALOGIT v4.2, MXL models with Train's Gauss code using 500 Halton draws.
As can be seen from the third column of Table 5 the preferred model, model FL-MXL4, has a value for the fixed link constant of £333.60 per household per annum and a marginal value for an operating hour of £26.40 (per household per annum). As before no confidence intervals are available for these results which derive from a mixed logit model. The robustness of the results rests on the how well the different parameters of the model have been estimated. As can be seen all are significant at the 95% level. Confidence intervals can be calculated for the preliminary MNL model (FL-MNL1) and these are +/-27% for the fixed link constant and +/-70% for the marginal value of operating hours.
Of relevance to this paper is the validity in the estimate of the marginal value for an operating hour. Unlike the marginal values per trip derived previously no other empirical work exists against which the derived value can be validated. The inclusion of a contingent valuation question allows an internal validation to occur. The data from the contingent valuation question indicates that the mean value to move from a 12 hour operating day to a 24 hour operating day is £269.50 (or £22.45 per hour) with a 95% confidence interval of +/-32%. It can therefore be seen that the fixed link stated preference data and the contingent valuation data give similar corroborating results. Notes: Mean and standard deviation values estimated using a monte-carlo simulation based on a population of 10,000 (split into the statistically relevant socio-economic groups from the model using sample proportions). Lowest and highest 2.5% are excluded from calculation of mean and standard deviation for models FL-MXL4 where the cost parameter is treated as random.
The change in consumer surplus and the compensating variation
To compare the change in consumer surplus ( CS ∆ ) and the compensating variation the findings from the analysis of the stated preference data are applied to the context of an actual transport intervention -the construction of fixed links to the islands of Scalpay, Berneray, Eriskay and Vatersay. Unlike the ferries the fixed links are free to use, i.e. there is no toll and give on average about a 15 minute journey time saving over the ferries. Furthermore the fixed links are available at all times of the day, whereas previously the ferries only operated a 12 hour day and at around a 75 minute headway on average.
Change in consumer surplus
Prior to construction of the fixed links an average 3.7 return person trips per household per week were made on the ferries to the islands (Halcrow, 1996; SQW, 2004) . This increases to 10.9 after construction of the fixed links. With reference to Figure 1 X 0 is therefore 3.7 whilst X 1 is 10.9. X c is unknown. As discussed previously in a transport appraisal it is normal to assume the Marshallian demand curve is linear. In which case the change in consumer surplus, Area GC 0 a'b'GC 1 , can be estimated using equation 3.
( )
With a linearly additive expression for generalised cost in headway, operating hours and price, as implied by equations 1 and 2, as well as time (T) and vehicle operating costs (VOC) this calculation can be disaggregated into a series of 'mini' consumer surplus calculations for each component of generalised cost. Summing these, as in equation 4, gives the total change in consumer surplus of the intervention.
where ( ) Focussing on the user benefit arising from a change in operating hours (i.e.
OH CS ∆
). As each of the ferries operated a 12 hour day, the construction of the causeway increases availability from a 12 hour day to a 24 hour day. From Table 3 (b) the marginal value of increasing operating hours from 12 hours to 24 hours is 19.7p/hr/single vehicle trip. With an average vehicle occupancy of 2.8 when travelling on the ferry (Halcrow, 1996; SQW, 2004) this implies a marginal value of 7.04 p/hr/single person trip (i.e. 14.07 p/hr/return person trip). The change in consumer surplus arising from an increase in operating day is therefore given by: User benefits from operating hours form 14.3% of the total change in consumer surplus of the Berneray Causeway (Laird, 2009 Chapter 9) . This implies that the average change in total consumer surplus across the four islands is about £4,500 per household per annum. This represents 27% of household disposable income 2 . Clearly this is large.
Compensating variation
With reference to Figure 1 the compensating variation is given by the maximum willingness to pay to move from indifference curve U 0 to U 1 , that is by the difference between G and J (equivalent to Area GC 0 a'c'GC 1 ). In this study this value has been elicited indirectly through stated preference questions couched in terms of willingness to pay over the course of a year through an increment in council tax. The result was validated with a contingent valuation question -a direct elicitation of the willingness to pay. From Table 5 the maximum willingness to pay per additional operating hour is £26.40 per household per annum. This implies the compensating variation of increasing operating hours from a 12 to 24 hr operating day is £316.80 per household per annum. An alternative estimate, £269.50, of the compensating variation can be obtained directly from the contingent valuation question.
DISCUSSION
A comparison between the change in consumer surplus estimated using the Rule of Half convention (∆CS ROH ) and the compensating variation indicates a large discrepancy. This discrepancy is £323.66 if comparing the ∆CS ROH against the compensating variation derived from the fixed link SP game model, and £370.96 if comparing against the contingent valuation result. The ∆CS ROH is therefore more than double either of the estimates of the compensating variation. This error is very serious in an appraisal context.
To be confident that there really is a large discrepancy between the ∆CS ROH and the compensating variation it is necessary to examine other potential explanations that may have given rise to the finding. Firstly, the finding could be an outcome of comparing two imprecise estimates. The robustness argument therefore hinges on the statistical significance of the difference between the ∆CS ROH and the compensating variation. Whilst no confidence intervals for the marginal values derived from the MXL models are available, confidence intervals are available from the MNL models. Taking these as representative of the robustness of the change in consumer surplus results and the compensating variation results implies 95% confidence intervals for the difference between the two estimates 3 as follows:
• +/-85% (i.e. a 95% confidence interval of £50 to £600) for the difference based on the estimate of the compensating variation from fixed link SP game; and.
• +/-49% (i.e. a 95% confidence interval of £190 to £550) for the difference based on the estimate of the compensating variation based on the contingent valuation estimate.
These are quite large ranges, though both indicate that a statistically significant difference exists. The comparison against the contingent valuation results also indicates that even at the lower end of the confidence interval the error associated with using the change in consumer surplus as an approximation to the compensating variation is about 50%.
Clearly two errors exist in measuring the exact welfare benefit. With the method adopted in this paper it is not possible to separate the two exactly. However experimentation with negative exponential demand curves indicate that a linear approximation to the demand curve (i.e. the use of the Rule of Half convention) may result in an overestimate of the change in consumer surplus of up to 40% (Laird, 2008 pp.160-162) . Though for such an overestimate to occur, the demand curve must be very convex to the origin 4 . This implies that with a 100% error between the 3 Standard errors and confidence intervals for the difference between the change in consumer surplus and the compensating variation were calculated following Hess and Daly (2008) . 4 Demand curve D 1 =D 0 e (-β.cost^0.3) , where D 1 is demand after intervention, D 0 is demand before the intervention and cost is the difference in generalised cost before ∆CS ROH and the compensating variation 43% of it is due to the presence of an income effect and 57% is due to the use of the Rule of Half. Willig's (1976) rule of thumb indicates that a difference of 43% between the change in consumer surplus and the compensating variation could only be associated with a change in consumer surplus as a proportion of income far in excess of the 27% estimated here -unless a very high income elasticity exists. This would suggest that the estimate of the error of including the income effect in the welfare benefit measure is too large. However, for transport interventions such large differences may occur because the intervention impacts on both the money budget constraint and the time budget constraint. Willig's analysis only considers the money budget constraint.
A contrasting argument to the above is that the difference between ∆CS ROH and the compensating variation is in part due to the presence of respondent bias in the datathe most relevant of which is scoping effect bias. This bias occurs as respondents have difficulty valuing the size of the benefit. This can result in small benefits (per trip) being valued too highly and large benefits (per annum) being valued too low. It has already been argued that the marginal values (per trip) implied by the models estimated to the data are comparable with other literature including that derived from revealed preferences. The consistency with revealed preference data in particular would suggest that the marginal values per trip are of the correct order of magnitude. The interest in this bias therefore becomes one of understanding whether the annual values are too low. This unfortunately cannot be answered with the existing data. Whilst there is consistency between the responses to the scenarios posed in the fixed link stated preference game and the response to the contingent valuation question it is possible that scoping effect bias has had a similar effect on both sets of data. As the survey was not designed to test for scoping effect bias no definitive answer can be given as to whether the phenomena has had a significant impact on the annual willingness to pay results. It is the author's opinion, however, that the annual willingness to pay results seem plausible when considered in relation to household incomes, whereas the change in consumer surplus values seem high.
On balance therefore the difference found between the two estimates of welfare benefit (in excess of £300 per household per annum) seems realistic, though possibly at the upper end of the range, when considered as the potential error between the exact welfare benefit of a transport intervention and one estimated using the ∆CS ROH .
CONCLUSION
The main conclusion of this paper is that the income effect and the error associated with assuming a linear demand curve, whilst ignored in almost all transport economic appraisals, can be important to the calculation of welfare benefits. For the example of the construction of fixed links in small remote island communities a standard transport appraisal can give an estimate of the change in consumer surplus that is over 25% of household disposable income. This is quite substantial. This derives from time savings, ferry fare savings and improvements in availability (frequency and operating hours). Focusing on the latter this study has estimated: marginal values per household trip of between 2.0 and 11.3 pence per headway minute, and between 19.7 and 34.7 pence per operating hour; as well as annual willingness to pay marginal values of between £22.45 and £26.40 per operating hour per household. By doing so it has been possible to compare the change in consumer surplus as and after the intervention. estimated in a conventional transport appraisal with the compensating variation.
There is a large discrepancy between the two values. For this particular example the estimated change in consumer surplus is more than double the compensating variation -the exact measure of welfare benefit of the transport intervention.
Up to 57% of this difference is attributed to the practice of assuming a linear Marshallian demand curve when estimating the change in consumer surplus (i.e. the Rule of Half). It is well known that the assumption of a linear demand curve in the presence of large cost changes can seriously overestimate the change in consumer surplus. Despite this the practice of making the assumption continues. This paper has therefore provided further evidence on the need to use alternative methods when estimating welfare benefits.
The remaining 43% of the difference is attributed to the presence of an income effect. Income effects become more important the larger the income elasticity of demand and the larger the benefit received is relative to income. Furthermore as transport schemes impact on both the money budget constraint and the time budget constraint income effects may be larger than would have been thought from an analysis of the money budget alone. Saying that until we have a better understanding of the implications of using the change in consumer surplus as an approximation to the exact welfare benefit in a transport appraisal it is important that analysts examine the scale of benefit accruing to households/individuals in relation to their income as a standard part of any appraisal (e.g. as suggested by Willig).
The nature of the empirical work means there is some uncertainty in the estimates, and this coupled with the potential presence of scoping effect bias in the data does mean the scale of the income effect may have been overestimated. Further research is needed. A potentially fruitful avenue could be to extend the empirical analysis presented in this paper to other scenarios with a larger relevance to national transport policy: such scenarios could include road pricing, or any infrastructure or pricing intervention in which large cost changes are experienced by frequent transport users (e.g. commuters). Further added value could be obtained by also collecting sufficient data to estimate the Marshallian and Hicksian demand curvessomething that was not possible with the existing dataset.
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